On 14 August 2026, Israeli ‘Defense’ Minister Israel Katz instructed the Israeli military to prepare a plan to transfer law-enforcement powers over Israeli settler matters in the occupied West Bank from the military to the Israeli police. Under the announced directive, the police would establish a dedicated force to handle these matters, while the military’s role would increasingly focus on what Israel describes as combating “terrorism” and protecting the borders and settlements. At this stage, however, no transfer of powers has been implemented. The announcement constitutes a directive to prepare a mechanism for a potential transfer, rather than a completed or legally operative change in the allocation of law-enforcement authority.
If implemented, transferring civilian law-enforcement functions concerning Israeli settlers from the military to an Israeli civilian police institution could further integrate the administration of Israeli settlers into Israel’s domestic governmental structures, while leaving the Palestinian population subject to a fundamentally different system of military authority and enforcement. In that context, the proposal warrants examination as a potential further step in the institutionalization of Israel’s permanent control over the occupied West Bank and the erosion of the distinction between the occupying power’s temporary authority and the exercise of Israeli governmental jurisdiction.
Additionally, If the proposed transfer is implemented, it risks further entrenching an environment of impunity for systemic and rising settler crimes. The significance of the proposal is not that it legally authorizes settlers to commit violence, but that it could signal a further withdrawal of the military from enforcing the law against Israeli settlers, while transferring responsibility to a civilian police structure. Although the military does not prevent settlers from committing their crimes against Palestinians, it protects and even accompanies settlers, yet, in practical terms, the proposal may be perceived by settlers as a signal that the military will no longer ‘stand in the way’ of their actions against Palestinians, or effectively intervene to prevent violence, intimidation, and abuse. This concern is particularly significant where the proposed transfer would place civilian law enforcement under the authority of Israel’s police and the political leadership responsible for policing. If implemented without effective safeguards, independent investigation, and equal enforcement, the arrangement will be entrenching the unlawful dual system applicable on the same land, one in which Israeli settlers receive civilian state protection while Palestinians remain subject to military rule, thereby reinforcing existing patterns of discrimination, selective enforcement and impunity for settler violence.
This development is far from being an isolated or sudden measure; it rather constitutes a new stage in a gradual process of restructuring Israel’s annexation system of the West Bank. It is considered a continuation of the significant transformation in the administration of civilian affairs that began in May 2024, when the Israeli Commander of the Central Command amended the order establishing the Civil Administration, allowing significant powers to be transferred from the military Head of the Civil Administration to his civilian deputy. These powers included land administration, planning and construction, enforcement, licensing, economic affairs, environmental matters, and archaeology. As a result, substantial aspects of the administration of civilian life were transferred from the military structure to a civilian official linked to the Israeli Ministry of Defense and government.
This change went beyond a mere administrative redistribution of powers. It weakened the direct role of the military leadership in administering the West Bank and transferred core powers relating to the day-to-day governance of the occupied territory to an Israeli structure. The function of providing legal advice concerning the administration of the West Bank was also transferred from the military legal adviser to the legal adviser of the Ministry of Defense, thereby incorporating the implementation of Israeli political policies into the legal framework governing the exercise of these powers. Consequently, these arrangements amount to a transfer of administrative and legislative powers from a system of military rule to a civilian system within the Israeli government.
This process then expanded in 2026 from the transfer of powers within the Israeli governmental structure to the expansion of the exercise of those powers into areas in which the Palestinian Authority is formally vested with civilian jurisdiction. In February 2026, the Israeli ‘Security’ Cabinet decided to authorize the Israeli Civil Administration to exercise enforcement and oversight powers in Areas A and B in the fields of environmental protection, water, and archaeology. The decision opened the door to Israeli intervention in civilian matters that, under the Oslo arrangements, fall within the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority. It followed earlier instances in which the government assumed enforcement powers in parts of Area B, resulting in the suspension of Palestinian development projects and the demolition of structures in areas that are formally subject to Palestinian jurisdiction.
Subsequent developments further demonstrate that this expansion is no longer confined to Area C of the occupied West Bank, which is occupied territory placed under interim Israeli control under the Oslo arrangements, and where Israel has for decades exercised unlawful policies of annexation and displacement. The Israeli government has recently, unilaterally and unlawfully, expanded its measures inside Areas A and B, including the establishment of outposts in Area B, the takeover of Palestinian land and structures, the use of military seizure orders for settlement-related purposes inside Area A, and the expansion of Israeli enforcement powers in these areas. These measures constitute an extension of a process that began in unlawful Israeli control and de facto annexation policies of Area C of occupied territory, then expanded into Area B and Area A over the past year, effectively eroding the boundaries established by the Oslo arrangements between areas under Palestinian and Israeli jurisdiction.
Legal Framework & Analysis
I. The Legal Status of the West Bank and the Nature of Israeli Occupation Therein
Under international law, the West Bank, including Jerusalem, remains occupied Palestinian territory since 1967. Israel’s effective control over the territory does not confer sovereignty upon it or entitle it to incorporate the territory into Israel. The law of occupation is primarily governed by the 1907 Hague Regulations and the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention, alongside customary international law and international human rights law. Under Article 43 of the Hague Regulations, the occupying power is required to take all measures within its power to restore and ensure public order and civil life, while Article 64 of the Fourth Geneva Convention confirms that the laws in force in the occupied territory remain applicable and may only be altered to the extent absolutely necessary in accordance with the rules governing occupation. Accordingly, the exercise of policing and law-enforcement functions in the West Bank must be strictly a temporary and legally constrained exercise of authority governed by the obligations imposed by the law of occupation on the occupying power.
The International Court of Justice (ICJ), in its Advisory Opinion of 19 July 2024, affirmed that the occupied Palestinian territory constitutes a single territorial unit and that Israeli policies and practices involving, inter alia, annexation or the assertion of permanent control over the territory, as well as the violation of the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination, render Israel’s entire and continued presence in the oPt unlawful. Accordingly, the legal question extends beyond whether the military is replaced by the police in law-enforcement functions, as international law does not require all public-order functions to be carried out by military forces. Rather, the issue concerns the nature of the authority exercised by the police, the law they apply, the scope of their jurisdiction, and on whose behalf they exercise their powers. The presence of Israeli police in occupied territory does not, in itself, constitute evidence of annexation. However, transferring civilian governmental functions to Israeli state institutions, expanding their jurisdiction over the occupied population and territory, and subjecting increasing aspects of civilian life to Israeli law and institutions constitute part of a broader pattern of imposing sovereignty or entrenching permanent control and annexation of the territory.
The significance of such a development becomes greater when it is accompanied by government institutions and policies that support settlement expansion and shield settlers from accountability for violations against Palestinians. In such circumstances, the transfer of jurisdiction is no longer merely an internal redistribution of law-enforcement functions, but may become part of a broader restructuring of the exercise of Israeli authority within the occupied territory in a manner that entrenches its institutional and legal integration into the Israeli system.
II. The Oslo Accords Do Not Confer Sovereignty over the West Bank
The 1995 Oslo II Agreement established interim arrangements for the allocation of certain civil and security powers between “Israel” and the Palestinian Authority and divided the West Bank into Areas A, B, and C. Under these arrangements, certain civil and security powers were transferred to the Palestinian Authority, while Israel retained extensive powers, particularly in Area C. The agreements were intended to establish transitional arrangements pending a permanent-status settlement, not to confer sovereignty upon Israel over the areas that remained under its control. Accordingly, the classification of the West Bank into Areas A, B, and C does not alter its underlying legal status as occupied territory. This is consistent with the ICJ’s 2024 Advisory Opinion, which rejected any interpretation of the Oslo Accords as providing Israel with a right to annex parts of the occupied territory or to maintain a permanent presence therein.
From this perspective, the extension of Israeli law enforcement into Areas A and B is of particular legal significance. According to the sources cited in the update, in February 2026 the Israeli Security Cabinet decided to allow the Civil Administration to exercise enforcement and oversight functions in Areas A and B in the fields of environmental protection, water, and archaeology, despite these areas having previously fallen within Palestinian civil jurisdiction under the existing arrangements. Subsequent developments have also documented the use of Israeli authorities and military orders to undertake enforcement measures within Areas A and B beyond the traditional security framework, including measures relating to settlements. Accordingly, the expansion from Area C into Areas B and A is legally significant not because the mere entry of Israeli authorities into these areas makes them “annexed,” but because it indicates a gradual erosion of the functional boundaries established by Oslo and an intentional expansion of Israeli governmental jurisdiction into areas in which Palestinian institutions are supposed to exercise civil authority.
III. De Facto Annexation and the Alteration of the Legal Status of the Occupied West Bank
The preceding and subsequent decisions and measures fall within the broader framework of de facto annexation, which may result from an accumulation of policies and practices aimed at permanently subjecting occupied territory to the sovereignty or legal and institutional system of the occupying state, or at undermining its character as a distinct territory.
In its 2024 Advisory Opinion, the ICJ linked Israel’s policies concerning annexation and permanent control to the violation of the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination and concluded that Israel’s continued presence in the oPt is unlawful. The Court also affirmed that this conclusion does not relieve Israel of its obligations under international law, including the law of occupation, for as long as it continues to exercise authority over the territory. Accordingly, the transfer of civilian law-enforcement functions to the Israeli police assumes greater legal significance when accompanied, as in the developments addressed in this update, by the transfer of civil powers to Israeli institutions, the expansion of Israeli enforcement into Areas A and B, the expansion of settlements and control over land, the reduction of Palestinian powers, and the application of Israeli legal regimes and institutions to increasing parts of the territory. In such circumstances, the transfer of enforcement functions may be understood as part of a broader process of transforming temporary and legally constrained control under the law of occupation into the permanent institutional exercise of Israeli authority.
IV. Implications for the Palestinian People’s Right to Self-Determination
Self-determination is considered an inalienable collective right, one that has formed a central component of the ICJ’s 2024 Advisory Opinion. The Court found that Israel’s policies and practices, including annexation, settlements, and policies aimed at perpetuating control over the territory, have deprived the Palestinian people of the exercise of their right to self-determination, and that this violation directly affects the legality of Israel’s continued presence in the oPt. Accordingly, weakening Palestinian governing institutions and expanding Israeli governmental jurisdiction into areas in which the Palestinian Authority is supposed to exercise civil authority is not merely a dispute over the administrative allocation of powers. If this process undermines the ability of the Palestinian people to exercise their civil and territorial authority independently, while entrenching the permanent exercise of Israeli governmental powers over increasingly large parts of the West Bank, it deepens the continuing violation of the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination.
V. Settlers and Law Enforcement
Israel, as the occupying power, remains obligated to protect the Palestinian population and ensure public order and safety within the limits imposed by the law of occupation, while also respecting their rights under international human rights law and international humanitarian law. Article 43 of the Hague Regulations imposes upon the occupying power the responsibility to maintain public order and civil life, and this responsibility is not limited to a particular category of the population.
Accordingly, the legal concern does not lie in replacing the military with the police as such, but may arise if this arrangement effectively creates a selective enforcement system that protects Israelis and settlers and provides them with civilian law enforcement through state institutions, while Palestinians are denied effective protection from violence or are subjected to Israeli enforcement mechanisms in areas that are supposed to fall under Palestinian jurisdiction. If a pattern of discrimination or systematic non-enforcement against settler violence is established, this raises separate issues under Israel’s obligations to protect the civilian population and uphold human rights, particularly the rights to life, security, equality, and protection from discriminatory treatment.
References
https://www.yesh-din.org/en/hcj-petition-repeal-the-transfer-of-powers-from-the-head-of-the-civil-administration-to-his-deputy-which-means-the-annexation-of-the-west-bank/
https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/de-facto-annexation-israel-shift-civilian-enforcement-west-bank-army-police
https://english.palinfo.com/reports/2026/08/15/368375/
https://peacenow.org.il/en/the-quiet-annexation-of-areas-a-and-b
Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (a.k.a. “Oslo II”) – Question of Palestine
Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, in