“Mishmar Yehuda”: From an Outpost to a Massive Settlement, Linking E1 and E2 Settlement Projects While Marking the Largest Land Seizure in Bethlehem in Decades

September 9, 2026
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In what marks the largest land seizure in the Bethlehem Governorate in decades, the “Mishmar Yehuda” settlement project is presented as a settlement “initiative” that would establish the nucleus of a new settlement city in the heart of the occupied West Bank, between Bethlehem and Jerusalem, serving as a link between the “E1” and the “E2” projects. 

According to the initial plans, the project includes approximately 3,600 housing units, while some plans indicate up to 3,750 units, potentially accommodating between 20,000 and 30,000 settlers. It also covers an area of approximately 3.75 million square meters, or around 3,750 dunums. The plans include the development of commercial and industrial areas, healthcare facilities, higher education institutions, and a network of roads and infrastructure connecting the area to Jerusalem and Tel Aviv.

The Israeli occupation authorities present the project as a response to the “housing crisis” and as a means of providing subsidized housing, with reported discounts of up to 50–60% compared with housing prices inside Israel, targeting young couples and segments of the Haredi community. The “housing crisis” is instead being resolved at the expense of Palestinian land unlawfully occupied, outside Israel’s internationally recognized borders, making the project part of a broader policy aimed at reshaping the demographic and urban structure of the West Bank.

Geographic Location and Targeted Lands

The “Mishmar Yehuda” project is located in northeastern Bethlehem Governorate, east of occupied Jerusalem, in an area of strategic importance due to its position between Palestinian communities and the major settlement blocs surrounding Jerusalem and Bethlehem. The project has been established on lands belonging to a number of Palestinian villages and communities, including Abu Dis, Arab al-Sawahrah, and al-Ubeidiya, within a broader geographic area that overlaps with lands belonging to several eastern Bethlehem villages, including Za’tara, Tuqu’, Kisan, al-Fardis, and eastern al-Ubeidiya.

The area gains additional significance from the project’s location between the settlements of “Ma’ale Adumim” and “Kedar” on the one hand, and the “Gush Etzion” settlement bloc on the other. It also lies within a vital area for Palestinian Bedouin and pastoral communities, particularly the al-Muntar and Wadi Abu Hindi communities. Consequently, the project’s effects are not limited to the owners of the lands directly targeted for appropriation, but extend to communities that depend on these spaces for movement, grazing, and access to resources, raising concerns over restrictions on access to land and resources and the shrinking of the space available for Palestinian communities to sustain themselves and pursue their natural development.

The “Mishmar Yehuda” project developed through a successive series of governmental, military, and administrative decisions that gradually transformed it from a proposed settlement project into an entity with an increasingly established geographic and administrative framework. In February 2023, the Israeli government formally approved the establishment of the project, marking a clear political starting point for advancing its implementation. In February 2024, the Israeli Central Command commander signed an order defining the jurisdiction of the settlement. This measure carries legal and administrative significance because it establishes the area over which the new settlement infrastructure would exercise authority and provides a basis for the development and expansion of its services and institutions. Subsequently, in January 2025, the occupation authorities allocated approximately 3,380 dunums to the project, expanding the scope of the lands designated for it and further consolidating its spatial footprint.

On 12 July 2026, the project took a further step toward institutional consolidation and expansion when Central Command Commander Avi Blot issued a military order changing its administrative status from a “local council” to a “city.” This change reflects the project’s transition to a more advanced stage of administrative organization and urban planning and creates a framework for strengthening government budgets, services, and infrastructure directed toward it, thereby supporting its transformation from a settlement community into a large and permanent urban center.

In late August 2026, Israeli authorities took a further step by announcing the confiscation and allocation of approximately 370.28 additional dunums of land belonging to Abu Dis and Arab al-Sawahrah, classifying them as “state land.” With the addition of this area to the lands previously allocated, the project’s total area reached approximately 3,750 dunums. The timing is significant, coming amid heightened political attention to E1 and broader Israeli electoral developments, creating a potential window for further extending the project’s geographic reach.

Impact of the “Mishmar Yehuda” Settlement on Bethlehem Governorate

The “Mishmar Yehuda” settlement project represents a significant transformation in the geographic environment of Bethlehem Governorate, emerging within a broader context in which the governorate is being gradually encircled by settlement blocs and Israeli infrastructure. After the Annexation Wall and the existing settlement blocs, particularly in the northern and western parts of the governorate, imposed extensive constraints on its geographic expansion, the project is now being advanced in the eastern and southeastern parts of the governorate, targeting the remaining open spaces toward the eastern desert. The consolidation and expansion of the project would further restrict the governorate’s ability to access and use its eastern lands, while narrowing the space available for its future urban and geographic expansion.

The impact extends beyond the issue of access to land, threatening to deepen the geographic isolation of Bethlehem Governorate and increasingly transform it into a Palestinian enclave surrounded by a system of settlements, roads, and Israeli infrastructure. 

The appropriation of the remaining open spaces in the eastern part of the governorate limits future possibilities for urban expansion and constrains the use of land for agriculture, grazing, and economic development. This, in turn, affects the governorate’s capacity to accommodate population growth and develop its economic activities. The project also threatens the agricultural and pastoral economy of the governorate’s eastern areas, as it targets lands that constitute a vital resource for rain-fed agriculture and livestock grazing for residents of towns and villages including Za’tara, Tuqu’, al-Fardis, Kisan, and eastern al-Ubeidiya.

 Beyond these direct impacts on land use and livelihoods, the location of “Mishmar Yehuda” is significant within the broader geography of settlement expansion around Bethlehem. The project lies within a geographic corridor extending eastward from Bethlehem, running through Beit Sahour and Dar Salah toward Al-Ubeidiya, and further east and northeast toward the E1 area and the Dead Sea. The expansion of settlements and outposts along this corridor may gradually facilitate territorial links between existing settlement blocs and newly established outposts, including the “Yatziv” settlement in Beit Sahour.

The loss of access to these lands, combined with restrictions on access to water sources and grazing areas, undermines the livelihoods and income sources dependent on them. This impact is particularly acute for Bedouin and pastoral communities, including Arab al-Rashaydeh, al-Rbai’ah, and the al-Muntar community, which comprises 112 families, as the continued appropriation of land and restrictions on access to resources may create a coercive environment.

The project’s geographic impact extends beyond the boundaries of Bethlehem Governorate, given its location in an area of strategic importance for connectivity between the northern and southern parts of the West Bank. The expansion of settlements and their associated infrastructure could restrict natural connectivity between Bethlehem and Hebron to the south, and between the area and Jerusalem and Ramallah to the north. At the same time, the project could function as a spatial link between the “Gush” Etzion” settlement bloc south and southwest of Bethlehem and the “Ma’ale Adumim” settlement bloc and Jerusalem to the northeast, reinforcing the continuity of the Israeli settlement space while contributing to further fragmentation of the Palestinian geographic space.

The establishment of “Mishmar Yehuda” is particularly significant in light of the scale of the targeted lands, the nature of the project, and the implications of their allocation. According to the available data, the project extends over approximately 3.75 million square meters, or around 3,750 dunums, a substantial area in the context of Bethlehem Governorate, which is already subject to extensive restrictions on land use and urban expansion. The significance of this figure lies not only in its size, but also in the location and function of the targeted lands. These lands form part of the governorate’s eastern geographic space, which serves as a resource for agriculture and grazing and represents one of the last relatively continuous open areas extending toward the eastern desert.

“Mishmar Yehuda” E1 and E2 Projects as an Interconnected Settlement Belt

The “Mishmar Yehuda” project cannot be analyzed in isolation from the broader settlement projects being developed around Jerusalem and Bethlehem, particularly the E1 and E2 settlement projects. The project’s geographic location, extending east of Jerusalem and northeast of Bethlehem across lands belonging to Abu Dis, Arab al-Sawahrah, and al-Ubeidiya, places it within a strategically significant area where settlement expansion intersects with key connectivity routes linking Jerusalem with central and southern parts of the West Bank.

The E1 project is located in the eastern part of Jerusalem, where settlement expansion around Ma’ale Adumim seeks to strengthen its territorial connection with Jerusalem through the E1 area. Completing this settlement connection would have direct implications for the continuity of the Palestinian geographic space, given the area’s location along one of the most important connectivity corridors between the northern, central, and southern parts of the West Bank.

By contrast, the E2 project, associated with the “Givat Eitam” plan, is located south of Bethlehem and seeks to establish a large settlement extension in the southern part of the governorate. This would further isolate Bethlehem from its southern surroundings and constrain its territorial extension toward Hebron. Within this geographic context, “Mishmar Yehuda” emerges as a link positioned between these two settlement expansions. When the three projects are considered in relation to one another, they can contribute to the formation of a relatively continuous settlement belt around Jerusalem and Bethlehem.

The significance of this geographic relationship becomes clearer when examining the complementary geographic functions of the three projects. While E1 seeks to strengthen control over the strategic corridor east of Jerusalem and constrain connectivity between different parts of the West Bank, E2 extends southward, placing additional pressure on Bethlehem’s geographic space. “Mishmar Yehuda,” meanwhile, occupies the area to the east and southeast of the governorate, further narrowing the remaining open space toward the Jerusalem desert. Taken together, these projects create a settlement belt with interconnected functions.

From a spatial-planning perspective, this interconnectedness contributes to the fragmentation of the Palestinian geographic space on two simultaneous levels. The first involves restricting connectivity between Palestinian communities themselves, particularly in the areas surrounding Jerusalem and Bethlehem. The second involves strengthening connectivity among Israeli settlement blocs through the lands, roads, and infrastructure associated with them. In this context, settlement roads and built-up areas function not merely as infrastructure serving settler populations, but also as instruments for reshaping patterns of movement and access to land.

This dynamic is also connected to a broader process of reshaping the surroundings of East Jerusalem and separating it from its Palestinian geographic hinterland. The consolidation of settlement blocs surrounding Jerusalem and their integration through Israeli infrastructure constrains the possibility of East Jerusalem remaining geographically connected to Palestinian communities in the West Bank. At the same time, simultaneous settlement pressure on the northern, eastern, and southern approaches to Bethlehem reduces the space within which the governorate can develop as an integrated part of the West Bank.

Legal and Analytical Framework

The legal Measures associated with the “Mishmar Yehuda” project are governed by the rules of customary international law, international humanitarian law (IHL), international human rights law (IHRL), and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, given the continued applicability of the law of occupation to the West Bank, including Jerusalem. 

The “Mishmar Yehuda” settlement project acquires particular legal significance in light of the International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) advisory opinion of 19 July 2024, did not treat settlement expansion and land appropriation as isolated measures, but situated them within a broader system of Israeli policies and practices that contribute to the consolidation of unlawful permanent control over parts of the oPt, alter its demographic and geographic character, and integrate parts of it into the Israeli domain. The Court concluded that Israel’s continued presence in the oPt is unlawful and linked this conclusion to violations of the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination, as well as to policies of annexation, settlement, discrimination, and the exploitation and appropriation of natural resources.

This legal framework is reinforced by United Nations Security Council Resolution 2334 (2016), which reaffirmed that the establishment of Israeli settlements in the Palestinian territory occupied since 1967, including East Jerusalem, has no legal validity and constitutes a flagrant violation of international law. The resolution also affirmed that the Security Council would not recognize any changes to the 4 June 1967 lines, including with regard to Jerusalem, other than those agreed upon by the parties through negotiations.

The law of occupation provides the primary framework for assessing the legality of these measures. Occupation does not transfer sovereignty over the occupied territory to the occupying power; rather, it grants the occupying power limited and temporary powers that require it, to the extent possible, to administer the territory while preserving the existing order and civilian life. Article 43 of the 1907 Hague Regulations requires the occupying power to respect the laws in force in the occupied territory and to administer it within the limits imposed by international law. Article 55 further regulates the status of public property by treating the occupying power as a temporary administrator and usufructuary, rather than as its owner or sovereign. Accordingly, classifying Palestinian lands as “state land” or issuing military orders reallocating them does not confer sovereignty over those lands upon Israel, nor does it alter their status as occupied territory.

The issue becomes more legally problematic when such administrative mechanisms are used to allocate extensive areas of land for the establishment and expansion of a permanent settlement. In such circumstances, land administration shifts away from a temporary function linked to the needs of the local population toward the permanent restructuring of the territory in ways that serve the interests of the occupying power and its civilian population.

This is directly connected to the prohibition contained in Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which prohibits the occupying power from transferring parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies. The central legal concern lies in the establishment of a permanent civilian presence of the occupying State’s population within occupied territory, together with the institutional and material infrastructure necessary for its continuation and expansion. This dimension becomes particularly evident when the construction of housing units is accompanied by the reallocation of land, changes to its administrative status, and the expansion of the settlement’s jurisdiction. Settlement expansion thus becomes an integrated process encompassing land, population, administration, and infrastructure.

This process also conflicts with the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination, a right whose centrality was reaffirmed by the ICJ in its 2024 advisory opinion. Self-determination presupposes the ability of a people living under occupation to exercise its future sovereignty over its territory and resources freely. When extensive areas of land are appropriated, reallocated to Israeli settlements, and connected to permanent road networks and infrastructure, while Palestinians are simultaneously subjected to restrictions on access to land and resources, the impact extends beyond depriving individuals of the use of particular parcels of land. It contributes to undermining the ability of the Palestinian population to preserve the territorial unity of its homeland, develop it, and utilize its resources for its own benefit. This is also connected to Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which recognizes the right of peoples to self-determination and to freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources.

The legal implications of the project are not confined to settlement expansion and land appropriation, but also extend to the conditions imposed on Palestinian communities and their potential to drive residents from their places of residence. Article 49(1) of the Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits the forcible transfer or deportation of protected persons from occupied territory. Assessing the risk of forcible transfer does not require a direct evacuation operation to occur in every case. Forcible transfer may arise where conditions are imposed on a population that make remaining in its place of residence impossible or unsustainable, taking into account the particular circumstances and facts of each case.

This rule is particularly relevant to the Bedouin and pastoral communities surrounding the project. The appropriation of land, restrictions on access to grazing areas and water sources, limitations on construction and expansion, together with the development of settlements and surrounding roads and infrastructure, may operate cumulatively to undermine the economic and social foundations necessary for these communities to remain in place. The legal concern therefore lies not only in the loss of property, but also in the creation of a coercive environment that undermines the conditions necessary for normal life and gradually pushes communities toward displacement. This impact warrants particular assessment with regard to the al-Muntar community and other pastoral communities that depend directly on the surrounding land, water, and grazing areas.

From the perspective of international criminal accountability, these developments may be relevant to the ongoing investigations before the ICC concerning the situation in the State of Palestine, particularly with regard to war crimes involving the transfer of the occupying State’s civilian population into occupied territory and the forcible transfer of protected persons. This does not mean that every planning decision or land-confiscation order, standing alone, constitutes a completed war crime. Rather, military orders, land-allocation decisions, structural plans, urban expansion measures, and evidence concerning affected populations may constitute evidentiary elements in a broader assessment of patterns of conduct, policy, and their consequences.

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