Hebron Under Siege: Collective Punishment as a Pretext to Forced Displacement

On 23 October 2026, Israeli occupation forces launched a large-scale military operation in Hebron and its surrounding areas following a shooting operation near the city’s northern entrance, close to Route 35. The operation involved the closure of the city’s main and secondary entrances, extensive restrictions on movement, raids on residential neighbourhoods, forced displacement of Palestinian families, demolition of residential and commercial properties, confiscation of vehicles, and arrest campaigns extending across Hebron Governorate and other parts of the occupied West Bank. As a result, more than 800,000 Palestinians are facing siege and forced displacement, and more than 3 million Palestinians in the West Bank are facing collective punishment.

The military operation has been accompanied by official statements presenting it as an effort to “reshape” or restore the security situation in the area, alongside threats of further measures against Palestinians and the Palestinian Authority. The Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said Israel will “destroy” the Hebron neighbourhood that was home to the two Palestinians who opened fire on its forces today. He added that the military has plans to carry out a major assault in the occupied West Bank, the largest since 1967, and in Hebron it “will implement the successful and aggressive model we used in the [northern West Bank] refugee camps”.

Israeli occupation authorities have also announced the closure of land crossings serving the West Bank on 27 October, the day of the Israeli Knesset elections, as the military operation in Hebron continues. Taken together, these developments are alarmingly indicative of the expansion of coercive measures against the Palestinian population aimed at forced displacement, the cumulative effects of military restrictions on civilian life, and the use of broad security measures in ways that extend their consequences far beyond the immediate site of the reported attack.

As of 25 October, approximately 300 to 500 families, about 2500 people, have been forced to flee the areas of al-Jalda and Deir Baha in Hebron, while around 1,000 families in the H2 area remained besieged inside their homes. These developments were accompanied with demolitions targeting buildings in several areas, including Farsh al-Hawa, Dura and al-Jalda. Journalists were also prevented from reporting from the city. Israeli flags were raised over evacuated residential buildings, and X-shaped markings were placed on some houses, raising residents’ fears that their homes could be targeted for demolition. The convergence of displacement, demolitions and a sustained military presence is particularly significant given the continuing uncertainty surrounding the fate of these homes and whether their residents will be able to return.

Demolitions and physical damage in Hebron Governorate affected residential, commercial and industrial properties. In Farsh al-Hawa alone, approximately 7 dunums equivalent to around 7,000 square metres had been bulldozed by the evening of 24 October. In addition, maps distributed to residents covered approximately 150 residential buildings and houses. 

The escalation was not limited to Hebron Governorate. Raids, closures and arrest campaigns extended to other cities and areas across the West Bank, including Ramallah, Nablus, Bethlehem, Jenin, Tubas, Tulkarem, Salfit, Qalqilya and Jericho. In Bethlehem Governorate, which was almost entirely sealed off except for one main entrance, Israeli occupation forces raided homes in several villages in the western and eastern parts of the governorate, including Husan and Battir in the west, and Hindaza, Janata and Tuqu’ in the east. Leaflets containing threats were also distributed to former Palestinian prisoners, warning them against participating in specified activities and threatening measures that could extend to their family members, relatives and friends.

The escalation has been accompanied by official rhetoric that leaves the scope and nature of potential Israeli measures open to undefined possibilities. In an interview with an Israeli television channel on the evening of 23 October 2026, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared that a “very big surprise” awaited the Palestinian Authority. Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich also announced plans to demolish buildings, linking such measures to achieving deterrence and imposing a price for the attack.

The military operation in Hebron Governorate cannot be examined in isolation from the acceleration of settlement expansion and the administrative changes aimed at reshaping control over land in the city and its surroundings. In the period preceding the operation, Israeli authorities continued advancing settlement plans within Hebron’s urban fabric and in settlements across the surrounding area. In September 2026, two plans comprising 567 settlement units were approved in the settlements of Asael and Beit Hagai, established on Palestinian land in the towns of Samu and Dura, respectively. Plans had advanced to expand the Israeli settler presence in the heart of Hebron’s Old City, including a project to construct 63 settlement units on the site of the former central vegetable market, alongside construction and expansion projects associated with settler religious institutions around Shalala Street and Beit Romano.

On 25 October 2026, 8 new settlement outposts in the southern Hebron Hills were announced, comprising two community settlements and 6 agricultural farms. The plan is being implemented in cooperation between the Settlement Administration within Israel’s Ministry of Defense, the ministry itself, and the settlement movement Amana. The stated objectives include strengthening the security of existing settlements, settlers and settlement roads, while consolidating and expanding the Israeli settler presence in strategically located areas. The announcement coincides with the escalation of Israeli military operations in Hebron, raising concerns about the broader context in which military restrictions, displacement and settlement expansion are unfolding.

This expansion goes beyond increasing the number of housing units; it is accompanied by changes to the administrative structures governing planning and land use. In June 2026, Israeli planning authorities assumed powers previously exercised by the Hebron Municipality over planning and construction in designated settlement areas and religious sites within the city, in a move affecting the arrangements established under the 1997 Hebron Protocol. This means that the physical expansion of settlements is proceeding alongside an expansion of Israeli institutions’ authority to determine the future use of land, while the ability of Palestinians and their institutions to influence these decisions remains limited.

The significance of this rhetoric lies in extending the effects of the threat beyond measures already implemented, by leaving Palestinians facing the possibility of further escalation without knowing its scope, timing or who may be affected. In a context where military operations coincide with the forced displacement of families, movement restrictions and property destruction, uncertainty is no longer merely a lack of information about future measures. It becomes an additional factor in undermining security, disrupting the ability to plan daily life and complicating decisions about whether to remain, leave or seek access to essential services. The absence of clearly defined limits on potential measures also broadens the perceived reach of the threat beyond areas directly targeted, deepening the prevailing climate of apprehension and uncertainty.

Legal Framework and Analysis 

I. Collective Punishment and the Erosion of Individual Responsibility

The legal assessment of Israeli measures in Hebron must begin with a fundamental distinction: the responsibility of individuals for a particular attack cannot be transferred to the wider population, nor can the pursuit of those suspected of involvement provide an unrestricted legal basis for measures affecting other residents, their families, homes and property. Under international humanitarian law governing occupation, Israel’s security responsibilities coexist with binding obligations to protect the civilian population. These obligations are not suspended by the occurrence of an attack. Rather, they determine the limits within which the occupying power may respond and prohibit the imposition of collective consequences on protected persons for acts they did not personally commit.

Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 establishes this prohibition expressly. It provides that no protected person may be punished for an offence they have not personally committed and prohibits collective penalties, measures of intimidation and reprisals against protected persons and their property. The provision protects more than individuals against the formal imposition of punishment: it prevents the displacement of responsibility from the person alleged to have committed an act onto a family, community or civilian population. Its application, therefore, cannot be determined solely by the terminology used by the Israeli authorities. It requires scrutiny of whom the measures affect, the grounds on which they are imposed, the purposes they serve and the consequences they produce.

This distinction is particularly significant in Hebron, where reported demolitions, displacement, widespread closures and threats directed at former Palestinian prisoners and their families have been accompanied by statements connecting the measures to deterrence and the imposition of a “price” for the attack. Where official rhetoric frames the consequences of an attack as a price to be paid by a broader community. 

II. Forced Displacement 

The prohibition of forcible transfer under Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention protects the presence of civilians in occupied territory against displacement that does not meet the Convention’s narrowly defined exceptions. Article 49(1) prohibits individual or mass forcible transfers of protected persons from occupied territory, as well as their deportation to the territory of the occupying power or any other country. 

The prohibition cannot be reduced to whether residents were physically forced to leave or received a formal evacuation order. The circumstances in which departure occurs are equally important. Where threats, insecurity, restrictions or the destruction of the conditions necessary to remain deprive residents of a genuine choice, displacement may be forcible even without the direct use of physical force. In its advisory opinion of 19 July 2024 on the “Legal Consequences Arising from Israel’s Policies and Practices in the Occupied Palestinian Territory”, the International Court of Justice affirmed that a transfer may be forcible where residents have no choice but to leave. The Court also emphasized the temporary character of evacuations permitted under Article 49 and the prohibition on making them permanent or indefinite.

Forced displacement becomes clearer when it is examined in relation to the measures that precede, accompany or follow it. Evacuation removes residents from their homes; demolition may deprive them of the physical possibility of returning; and continued closures may prevent access to homes, livelihoods and essential services. Where these measures overlap, the consequences cannot be adequately assessed by considering the moment of departure alone. The inquiry must also establish what happens after residents leave, whether their homes remain accessible and habitable, and whether restrictions or destruction prolong their absence beyond the period justified by any lawful evacuation.

This interaction is legally consequential because a measure presented as temporary may, through its implementation and subsequent effects, produce displacement that is permanent or indefinite in practice. The relevant evidence therefore includes not only evacuation orders and the conditions of departure, but also the fate of the affected buildings, the duration of closures, the availability of accommodation and the actual possibility of return. If the evidence establishes that protected persons were forcibly transferred without satisfying the applicable exception under Article 49, the transfer may constitute a violation of international humanitarian law and may amount to a war crime if the elements of the relevant offence are established. The assessment must remain grounded in evidence, while recognizing that the legal consequences of displacement cannot be separated from the conditions created for those who have been displaced.

The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court provides a further framework for assessing the criminal responsibility that may arise from forced displacement. Article 8(2)(a)(vii) criminalizes the unlawful deportation or transfer of protected persons as a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions, while Article 8(2)(b)(viii) identifies the deportation or transfer of all or parts of the population of an occupied territory, within or outside that territory, as a war crime in an international armed conflict. The Statute’s definition of deportation or forcible transfer under Article 7(2)(d), in the context of crimes against humanity, further refers to the forced displacement of persons by expulsion or other coercive acts from an area in which they are lawfully present, without grounds permitted under international law

III. The Destruction of Property: Military Necessity, Punitive Purpose and the Possibility of Return

Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits the occupying power from destroying real or personal property belonging individually or collectively to private persons, the State, public authorities or social or cooperative organizations, except where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations. Article 46 of the 1907 Hague Regulations also requires respect for private property and prohibits its confiscation. Together, these provisions place strict limits on the occupying power’s authority over civilian property. The fact that an occupying power invokes security or deterrence does not, in itself, satisfy the requirement of absolute military necessity, nor does a general security objective provide an unrestricted justification for the destruction of homes and commercial buildings.

Reports of demolitions affecting residential and commercial buildings in Farsh al-Hawa, Dura and al-Jalda must therefore be assessed against the circumstances and justification for each act of destruction. The relevant distinction is between destruction that meets the applicable legal requirements of military necessity and destruction that serves another purpose, including the punishment or intimidation of civilians or the imposition of consequences on a wider community. Statements linking demolitions to the need to impose a “price” for the attack are relevant to this inquiry because they may illuminate the purpose attributed to the destruction by those announcing or implementing it. They do not, without further evidence, establish the unlawfulness of every demolition. Their significance must be assessed alongside the nature of the property destroyed, its use, the asserted military necessity and the circumstances in which the destruction occurred.

The legal inquiry must consequently extend beyond recording the number of structures damaged or demolished. It must establish whether the property was civilian or constituted a military objective, what justification was advanced for its destruction, whether the destruction was absolutely necessary in the circumstances, and whether the evidence supports the stated rationale. Where the language of deterrence or collective cost accompanies the destruction of civilian property, the question is whether the destruction was genuinely dictated by the requirements of military operations or was used to pursue a punitive objective that international humanitarian law does not permit. This distinction is central to assessing compliance with Article 53 and prevents the invocation of security from being treated as sufficient proof of legality.

The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court further criminalizes, under Article 8(2)(a)(iv), extensive destruction and appropriation of property not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly, subject to the other elements of the offence. Establishing that buildings have been demolished does not, on its own, establish this war crime. The scale and circumstances of the destruction, the status and use of the property, the justification advanced, and the remaining legal elements must be substantiated. Nevertheless, evidence concerning the stated purpose of demolitions is integral to the analysis and should be documented alongside the physical destruction itself.

The effects of demolition also extend beyond the immediate loss of property. A home is not merely a physical structure: its destruction may sever residents’ access to their place of residence, undermine their livelihood and make the restoration of ordinary life impossible. These consequences become particularly significant when destruction follows evacuation or occurs amid continuing restrictions on movement. Under such circumstances, demolition may consolidate the effects of displacement by eliminating the material conditions required for return. Continued closure may then prevent residents from accessing what remains of their property or rebuilding their lives in the area.

The relationship between destruction and displacement must therefore form part of the legal assessment. If residents are required to leave, their homes are subsequently destroyed and restrictions prevent their return, the combined effects may transform an ostensibly temporary evacuation into a prolonged or indefinite displacement. Establishing whether this has occurred requires evidence about the sequence of events, the fate of the buildings, the duration of restrictions and the actual conditions for return. The significance of the destruction lies not only in the damage inflicted at the time, but also in whether it contributes to a continuing condition in which residents are unable to resume their lives in their homes and communities.

III. The Destruction of Property: Military Necessity and the Possibility of Return

Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits the occupying power from destroying real or personal property belonging individually or collectively to private persons, the State, public authorities or social or cooperative organizations, except where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations. Article 46 of the 1907 Hague Regulations also requires respect for private property and prohibits its confiscation. Together, these provisions place strict limits on the occupying power’s authority over civilian property. The fact that an occupying power invokes security or deterrence does not, in itself, satisfy the requirement of absolute military necessity, nor does a general security objective provide an unrestricted justification for the destruction of homes and commercial buildings.

Where the language of deterrence or collective cost accompanies the destruction of civilian property, the question is whether the destruction was genuinely dictated by the requirements of military operations or was used to pursue a punitive objective that international humanitarian law does not permit. This distinction is central to assessing compliance with Article 53 and prevents the invocation of security from being treated as sufficient proof of legality. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court further criminalizes, under Article 8(2)(a)(iv), extensive destruction and appropriation of property not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly, subject to the other elements of the offence. 

The effects of demolition also extend beyond the immediate loss of property. A home is not merely a physical structure: its destruction may sever residents’ access to their place of residence, undermine their livelihood and make the restoration of ordinary life impossible. These consequences become particularly significant when destruction follows evacuation or occurs amid continuing restrictions on movement. Under such circumstances, demolition may consolidate the effects of displacement by eliminating the material conditions required for return. Continued closure may then prevent residents from accessing what remains of their property or rebuilding their lives in the area.

IV. Closures, Raids and Arrests 

Under international humanitarian law, Israel’s security obligations as an occupying power do not permit unrestricted interference with the lives of protected civilians. Articles 27 and 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, alongside Article 43 of the Hague Regulations, require that security measures remain consistent with the protection of civilians and prohibit intimidation and collective punishment.

Closures across Hebron and restrictions on movement elsewhere in the West Bank must be assessed by their scope, duration and impact on civilian life. Where they obstruct access to healthcare, education, workplaces and essential services, they impose consequences on the wider population that cannot be justified by a general invocation of security alone. Their effects may be compounded when residents are simultaneously displaced or prevented from returning to damaged homes.

Reports of house-to-house searches, arrests and threats against Palestinians and their families further raise concerns about the treatment of civilians and the reach of the measures imposed. Such conduct must be assessed against Israel’s obligations under occupation, including the prohibition of collective punishment where harm or intimidation is used to pressure individuals through their relatives or communities.

Restrictions on journalists and independent observers, where documented, may further obstruct the verification of displacement, property destruction and the treatment of residents. Independent access is therefore essential to establish the extent of the measures imposed, their effects on civilians and Israel’s responsibility for the resulting harm. 

VI. Settlement Expansion and the Restructuring of Palestinian Space in Hebron

Against the backdrop of the aforementioned settlement plans in Hebron, the displacement, demolition, and closure measures imposed in Hebron during October 2026 raise the alarm that their cumulative effects may further fragment Palestinian space and undermine the conditions necessary for residents to remain in their homes and access land and essential services. Temporal coincidence alone does not establish that the military operation was conducted to facilitate a particular settlement plan. However, situating the operation within the broader context of continuing settlement expansion and the transfer of planning powers warrants an examination of the relationship between the geographical scope of military operations and the locations of displacement and demolition, on the one hand, and settlement expansion areas and their associated road networks and infrastructure, on the other. Where military restrictions intersect with settlement expansion and administrative changes, the consequences extend beyond temporary security measures to affect the spatial and legal conditions that determine Palestinians’ ability to remain on their land and exercise their rights there.

XI. Hebron: A Population Centre and Pillar of the Palestinian Economy

The significance of the operation cannot be understood solely through the geographical areas directly subjected to raids, closures and demolitions. Hebron is the largest Palestinian city in the occupied West Bank by population and one of the principal pillars of the Palestinian economy. Its extensive industrial and commercial base includes stone and marble, metalworking, leather, textiles and glass production, alongside a dense network of workshops. These activities sustain tens of thousands of livelihoods and connect the city to wider commercial networks across the southern West Bank and beyond.

Hebron’s economic importance is inseparable from its role as a centre of employment, production, distribution and trade. Its transport connections facilitate the movement of workers, raw materials and finished goods, while its industrial clusters and accumulated craft expertise support domestic production and export capacity. Disrupting movement into and out of the city, preventing access to commercial premises, destroying productive infrastructure and confiscating vehicles therefore threatens more than the assets of individual owners. Such measures can interrupt supply chains, obstruct the movement of goods and labour, deprive households of income and undermine the economic activity on which neighboring communities also depend.

References:
Area H1 – H2 – Mapping Hebron’s Apartheid 
Israel preparing full lockdown of occupied West Bank after Hebron gunfight | Israel-Palestine conflict News | Al Jazeera 
Israel Forcibly Displaces 2,500 Palestinians, Imposes Collective Punishment and Conducts Widespread Retaliatory Acts against Civilians in Hebron | Palestinian Centre for Human Rights 
الجهاز المركزي للاحصاء الفلسطيني | عدد السكان المقدر في منتصف العام لمحافظة الخليل حسب التجمع 2017-2026 
الخليل كـ “كانتون اقتصادي” في ظل مشاريع الضم  
Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, in 
THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights | OHCHR 
​​Economic, social and cultural rights | OHCHR 
Times of Israel: Netanyahu: Hebron neighborhood of gunmen in checkpoint attack to be ‘destroyed’